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Agricultural biotechnologies, and especially transgenic crops, have the potential to 
offer higher incomes to biotech firms and farmers, and lower-priced and better quality food 
for consumers. However, the welfare effects of adoption of genetically modified (GM) food 
and feed crop varieties are being affected not only by some countries’ strict regulations 
governing GM food production and consumption, but also by their choice of food trade policy 
instruments. Specifically, notwithstanding the ending of the European Union’s GM 
moratorium in April 2004, the continuing use by the EU of strict labeling and liability laws 
and of variable trade taxes-cum-subsidies and tariff rate quotas is reducing the aggregate gains 
from new biotechnologies and the incentive for EU taxpayers and for life science companies 
to support GM food research. The use of variable levies and prohibitive out-of-quota MFN 
tariffs in particular is yet another reason to push for an ambitious outcome from the WTO’s 
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There is a small but rich literature on the consequences of market distortions 
for the aggregate size and distribution of the benefits (positive and negative) from 
agricultural R&D. A neat synopsis of the key analyses and conclusions can be found 
in Alston and Pardey (1996, pp.184-98). A consensus in that literature is that the 
aggregate size of the benefits is likely to be far less affected by price-distorting 
policies than is their distribution. While this certainly is the case if distortion rates are 
not altered when new farm technologies appear, it turns out to be less so if those rates 
are endogenous to technological change at home or to terms of trade changes 
following adoption of new technology abroad. And despite the efforts of the Uruguay 
Round’s agricultural and sanitary and phytosanitary agreements to discipline 
agricultural protection, much scope evidently remains for World Trade Organization 
(WTO) members to vary their price distortions. With respect to products that may 
contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs), one way this is being done is to 
limit imports produced with the new biotechnology (via bans or strict labeling 
regulations), on the grounds that they may harm the environment or be a risk to 
human health. Another is by having support measures that vary import tariff/export 




maintain a constant domestic price in the wake of new technology being adopted 
abroad or at home.  
The emergence in the 1990s of transgenic crop varieties initially offered hope 
that the private sector might boost public funding of agricultural research. But 
concerns soon arose to dampen that optimism. A key one was that Europeans and 
others would reject the technology on environmental and food safety grounds, thereby 
thwarting export market prospects for adopters of the transgenic crops. That concern 
was vindicated when the European Union imposed in 1998 of a de facto moratorium 
on the production and importation of food products that may contain GMOs. As a 
result, widespread adoption of new food crop varieties from the fledgling Gene 
Revolution has been limited to date to just three products (maize, soybean and canola) 
in three countries: Argentina, Canada and the United States (James 2004). True, the 
EU replaced its moratorium on 1 May 2004 with new legislation, but it involves strict 
GM labeling regulations and liability laws that demand the implementation of 
expensive segregation and identity preservation systems that – especially for 
developing countries -- may be as restrictive of exports of GM products as was the 
moratorium. With a number of other countries also imposing strict labeling 
regulations on GM foods and no harmonization of those standards (Carter and Gruere 
2005), biotech firms are increasingly diverting their R&D investments away from 
food. Many public agricultural research systems also have remained shy about 
investing heavily in this technology, including the CGIAR’s international agricultural 
research centers which depend largely on rich-country grants. The legality of the EU’s 
restrictions on imports of GM products has begun to be tested by the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body, but the issue will take years to resolve (Anderson and Jackson 




Varying import taxes/export subsidies/domestic price supports is legally 
possible under WTO law for any member while ever its applied tariff or producer or 
export subsidy is below the member’s bound commitment for the product and 
measure in question. It also happens for a country automatically – and again without 
contravening WTO commitments – when the international price falls following 
adoption of new technology abroad and a tariff rate quota (TRQ) applies and is filled 
and the out-of-quota MFN tariff is prohibitive. Since TRQ are prevalent in the EU and 
more than 30 other countries, and there is a great deal of ‘binding overhang’ even in 
cases where MFN tariffs are not prohibitive, many WTO members still have scope to 
vary their agricultural protection rates. In the case of import tariffs, the bound rate for 
all agricultural products averages more than twice the applied rate for both developed 
and developing countries (Table 1). The binding overhang is even greater for the crop 
products of most relevance to the new agricultural biotechnologies, although 
somewhat less so for the European Union than for other developed countries (Table 
2). It is TRQs plus this gap, together with a similarly large binding overhand in 
agricultural domestic support commitments, that has allowed the aggregate levels of 
producer subsidy equivalent estimates to remain almost as high today as they were 
when the Uruguay Round negotiations began in the latter 1980s (Figure 1). Nor is the 
Doha Development Agenda likely to lead to a rapid closing of that gap unless WTO 
trade negotiators become far more ambitious over the next year or two (Anderson and 
Martin 2005), so this prospect for variable protection rates will be with us for the 
foreseeable future. 
  This paper begins by using standard partial equilibrium theory to show the 
ways in which the adoption of GM crop varieties by some countries affects other 




endogenous policy responses to the new biotechnology (a virtual import ban, or the 
maintenance of domestic prices via variable levies/subsidies or TRQs) can alter not 
just the distribution but also the aggregate size of the economic benefits from that 
R&D. It then draws on recent computable general equilibrium simulation analyses to 
show how important those possibilities may be empirically. The final section draws 
out some policy implications of the results, particularly for the Doha round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
2. Simple economics of GM crop technology in a world with variable trade 
distortion 
 
Leaving aside the biotechnology research industry, this section considers the 
market for a single crop such as maize for which a new variety is genetically 
engineered and made available in the form of purchasable seed by a biotech firm or 
public research institution. To set the scene, we first look at the effects in a small 
country of adoption of this cost-reducing technology at home or abroad in the absence 
of any trade policy responses. This is done both without and with an existing import 
tariff/export subsidy in place, to show the (un)importance of such measures on the 
results when the rate of protection is unchanged. The large-country case is then 
similarly considered, but in the case of adoption abroad we also explore the impact of 
it responding with either a variable levy to maintain the domestic price or a ban on 
imports from GM-adopting countries (or having a TRQ in place whose delivered 
protection rises when the international price falls). The final case analyses the effects 
on the international market, so as to be able to see also the impacts on GM-adopting 




2.1 Effects of GM adoption on a small country imposing an import tariff/export 
subsidy 
  Consider a small country importing this product but unable to influence its 
international price, Pw. The effects domestically of its GM adoption are shown in 
Figure 2, assuming that domestic consumers are indifferent to whether the product 
may contain GMOs (to be relaxed later). The cost-reducing technology causes a 
downward shift in the supply curve from S to S’, which is assumed for convenience to 
be parallel. In the absence of trade policy distortions, this increases producer and 
national economic welfare by area abcd.  
If there was a tariff in place that had raised the domestic price from Pw to Pt, 
GM adoption would raise producer welfare by area aefd (> area abcd), but decrease 
government tariff revenue by area efhg (= area bcfe), so national welfare would 
increase by only area abcd – the same as in the absence of the tariff.  
Were producers supported even more by an export subsidy (and an 
accompanying tariff to prevent imports for subsidized re-export) that held the 
domestic price at Ps, producers would gain – and taxpayers would lose – even more 
than with just the lower tariff: the producer surplus following adoption would be 
raised by area ajkd (> area aefd) while government revenue would be lowered by the 
increase in the export subsidy payment of area jknm (= area bckj), so net national 
welfare is again increased by only area abcd in Figure 2.  
Both cases provide the standard conclusion for a small country that an 
unchanged price-distorting policy alters the distribution of welfare but not the 
aggregate national welfare gain from a new farm technology. Presumably that 
protection policy thus raises the producers’ demand for the new technology, while 




What about the effect on this economy of GM adoption abroad? Adoption by 
enough producers to lower the international price from Pw to Pw’ in Figure 3 would 
benefit this importing economy provided its tariff was not and did not remain 
prohibitive, but that gain is greater the smaller the tariff. With no tariff the gain in 
consumer welfare net of the loss to producers is area qbwx in Figure 3 – the 
maximum gain from improved terms of international trade. If instead a non-
prohibitive specific tariff of Pt–Pw applied, the gain would be smaller but still positive, 
namely area yevu, following the international price fall. That is, even with an 
unchanged tariff, the importing country gains less from adoption abroad the larger is 
that tariff. And if that country chose to raise its tariff to offset the effect of the fall in 
Pw on the domestic price, then it would gain even less from GM adoption abroad – 
and nothing at all if the tariff increase fully offset the international price. The latter 
would also be the case if a tariff rate quota operated and the out-of-quota tariff was 
prohibitive and the quota itself was filled. 
 
2.2 Effects of GM adoption on a large country imposing an import restriction 
  What about when the importing country is large enough to influence the 
international market for this product? The analysis of Figure 3 in the previous 
paragraph applies equally to the large importing country enjoying a terms of trade 
improvement from GM adoption abroad (where again its consumers are assumed for 
the moment to be indifferent to GM food), assuming no change in this country’s tariff. 
The only difference is that Pw would have fallen less than in the small-country case 
following GM adoption abroad, because of the greater quantity demanded by this 




When the assumption of no trade policy response is relaxed, qualifications are 
again needed. For example, if the importing country’s tariff is raised following the 
international price fall so as to keep the domestic price at Pt, or that is achieved by 
having a tariff rate quota that is filled and an out-of-quota tariff that is prohibitive, the 
national gain from GM adoption abroad again would be foregone. But unlike in the 
small country case, in this case the larger the importing country’s imports prior to 
adoption abroad, the larger would be the fall in Pw with this variable levy response. 
That is, the variable levy not only eliminates the gain to that country from GM 
adoption abroad, but it also (a) reduces the gain from this new biotechnology to the 
adopting countries, and (b) raises the loss to all other countries that, as net exporters 
of the conventional (non-GM) variant of this product, suffer a terms of trade loss. The 
same would apply with a variable export subsidy. 
Alternatively, if the importing country were to ban imports of this product 
from GM-adopting countries, that would push the domestic price above Pt’ to a level 
that could be more or less than Pt, depending on how large the GM-adopters are in 
international markets. As shown in the next sub-section, this reduces the gain from 
this new biotechnology to the adopting countries but raises the loss to other countries 
exporting non-GM varieties of this crop. 
Were this large importing country to allow GM adoption domestically, its 
supply curve would shift out from S to S’ (again assumed for convenience to be a 
parallel shift) in Figure 3. In the presence of a zero or fixed import tariff this would 
depress the international price (for diagrammatic convenience to, say, Pw’) following 
the decline in the country’s import demand by quantity bw-rx (or ev-su in the case of 
a positive tariff). That would reduce the prospects of GM adopters abroad gaining and 




the case of no tariff (or if area adsy exceeds area yePtPt’ in the case of a positive 
tariff). However, if the tariff is raised after GM adoption so as to maintain the pre-
adoption domestic price Pt, producer welfare in this country would unequivocally 
improve (by area daez) while that of overseas producers would be depressed by 
further downward pressure on Pw. 
  
2.3 International market effects of sub-global GM adoption  
  Adoption of that new GM maize variety in some maize-exporting countries 
provides importing countries with the option of continuing to buy from those 
exporters a crop that now may contain GMOs, or buying a GM-free product from 
non-adopting countries. The former international market is shown in Figure 4(a), the 
latter in Figure 4(b), in both cases assuming no price-distorting policies are 
introduced. In Figure 4(a), ESg and EDg are the excess supply and excess demand 
curves for the GM-adopting countries’ surplus prior to adoption; and in Figure 4(b), 
ESn and EDn are the excess supply and excess demand curves for the exporting 
countries choosing not to adopt GM varieties yet. Adoption of a GM variety by some 
producers in the first group of exporting countries is assumed to lower production 
costs there such that ESg shifts down to ESg’. If consumers in importing countries (as 
is assumed throughout to be the case in exporting countries) were indifferent about 
whether the crop may contain GMOs, EDg would remain unchanged and the unit 
value of that bilateral trade would fall from b to e. Net economic welfare would 
increase in the importing countries by area bcfe (the gain to their consumers would 




adopting countries would change by the area def minus area abc. A sufficient 
condition for that to be positive is that ESg is parallel to ESg’.
1 
  What if some consumers in some of the importing countries consider the GM-
free variety to be superior and therefore prefer it over supplies that may contain 
GMOs? That would cause the EDg curve in Figure 4(a) to shift leftwards to EDg’. It 
would depress the unit value of that bilateral trade even more, to g, and may even lead 
to the export volume being smaller than before adoption (if h is to the left of c). 
Consumers of the GM variety benefit even more from its low price, but producers in 
the adopting countries (who are assumed not to segregate GM and non-GM varieties) 
are more likely to be worse off. 
How does all this affect the GM-free exporting countries? On the one hand, if 
consumers consider the GM and non-GM varieties as perfect substitutes, then the 
increased volume and lower price of exports from GM-adopting countries would shift 
EDn to EDn’ in Figure 4(b), lowering export revenue and net economic welfare in 
non-adopting exporting countries where producer losses would exceed gains to 
consumers in those countries by area vwzy. On the other hand, if some consumers in 
some importing countries prefer the GM-free product, the leftward shift in EDn would 
be smaller or that curve may even end up to the right rather than the left of its original 
position. If that substitution effect is strong enough to place EDn’ to the right of EDn, 
producers in the GM-free exporting countries would be better rather than worse off 
                                                 
1 If, however, that supply shift is wedge-shaped such that points a and d are closer together or coincide, 
we know from the theory of immizerizing growth (Bhagwati 1958) that the GM-adopting countries 
could be worse off if the excess demand curve they face is sufficiently inelastic. Lindner and Jarrett 
(1978) show that, even with a completely inelastic demand curve, a parallel shift (but not a pivotal 
shift) downwards in the supply curve will not reduce the exporting countries’ surplus. Were the supply 
curve to shift downwards only to the left of point c in Figure 4(a) -- that is, if only lower-cost infra-
marginal producers were able to adopt the new biotechnology -- all the benefits would stay with the 
GM-adopting producers (but be shared with the biotech firm that engineered that new GM variety, not 




following GM adoption abroad, and conversely for consumers in those exporting 
countries. 
Should some of the importing countries choose to ban imports of this product 
from countries adopting the GM variety (in the assumed absence of segregation and 
an identity preservation system), the leftward shift of EDg in Figure 4(a) would be 
greater and that of EDn in Figure 4(b) would be less (or be more likely to be a 
rightward shift). In this case the government’s import ban is effectively forcing all of 
its consumers to buy only GM-free varieties, which makes them higher-priced, so 
consumer welfare in such importing countries – and producer welfare in GM-adopting 
countries – will be less than if consumers were free to choose whether to avoid 
imports that may contain GMOs.
2 However, producers in the countries imposing the 
ban, and in GM-free exporting countries, will be better off with such a ban in place 
than under free trade while ever they are denied the right to adopt the new technology. 
Hence it is an empirical question as to whether they would be better off in that 
situation or being able to adopt the technically more productive GM variety if the 
latter required (to avoid violating WTO national treatment rules) the removal of the 
GM import ban. 
  Were that import ban to be replaced by strict labelling and associated liability 
laws, as happened in the EU in April 2004, importers would be even less inclined to 
buy from GM-adopting countries -- including in cases where the GM crop varieties 
grown there had been approved by the EU prior to 1998 (as with some GM soybean 
varieties) – because of the now-higher costs of compliance with the new labelling 
laws that require segregation and identity preservation back down the value chain to 
                                                 
2 The presumption here is that the deadweight welfare cost of segregation and identity preservation 
through the value chain is modest, as it seems to be for segregating different qualities of each 
traditional grain at present. For a model in which such costs are non-trivial and so the welfare costs are 




the farmer. The more GM-adopting countries there are that cannot provide credible 
certification to importers, the larger would be the further leftward shift in the EDg 
curve in Figure 4(a).  
 
It is clear from the above sample of situations that not even some of the signs, 
let alone the sizes, of the welfare effects of GM adoption by a sub-set of countries can 
be determined a priori when there are trade policy responses by other countries. 
Hence the need for quantitative analysis of global markets for the relevant products. 
Such analysis needs to go beyond the above one-crop model so as also to take account 
of products that are close substitutes or complements in production and/or 
consumption or are inputs into other activities. Of particular importance in this case is 
the livestock sector, since maize and soybean (the first two GM food crops developed) 
are major inputs into the intensive segment of livestock production but not the 
extensive segment that still relies on grazing pastures. The most comprehensive way 
to meet these needs is to use a global economy-wide model of trading nations. 
 
3. Empirical estimates of the effects of GM adoption and trade policy responses 
  
Estimating the welfare consequences of actual and prospective GM crop 
adoption by some countries and of policy responses by others has been the focus of 
numerous recent studies. Here there is room only to provide summaries of three sets 
of simulation results that pertain specifically to the analytical issues raised in the 
previous section. All employ the same well-received CGE model of the world 
economy known as GTAP (described in Hertel 1997). The first set assumes the 




apart from the EU imposing a ban on imports from GM-adopting countries of 
products that may contain GMOs. The second set specifically examines the impact of 
the EU’s existing trade taxes/subsidies on the size of the estimated welfare effects of 
GM adoption abroad without versus with a ban on imports from GM-adopting 
countries. By way of contrast, the third set assumes the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy insulates domestic producers somewhat from the fall in international prices that 
follows the adoption of GM crop varieties abroad.   
 
3.1 Effects of sub-global GM adoption without and with the EU moratorium 
A recent study by Anderson and Jackson (2005a) begins with GM adoption for 
just coarse grains and oilseeds but then adds rice and wheat, to get a feel for the 
relative economic importance to different regions and the world as a whole of current 
versus prospective GM crop technologies. That study modified the GTAP model 
(with its Version 5 database) so it could capture the effects of productivity increases 
of GM crops, some consumer aversion to products containing GMOs, and 
substitutability between GM and non-GM crop varieties as intermediate inputs into 
final consumable food. The impacts of GM adoption by just the US, Canada and 
Argentina are considered first, without and then with an import ban by the EU. The 
EU is then added to the list of adopters to explore the tradeoffs for the EU between 
productivity growth via GM adoption and the non-pecuniary benefits of remaining 
GM-free given the prior move to adopt in the Americas. A change of policy in the EU 
to allow the adoption and sale of GM crop products would reduce the reticence of the 
rest of the world to adopt GM crop varieties, so the effects of all other countries then 




Specifically, the base case in the GTAP model, which is calibrated to 1997 just 
prior to the EU moratorium being imposed, is compared with an alternative set of 
simulations whereby the effects of adoption of currently available GM varieties of 
maize, soybean and canola by the first adopters (Argentina, Canada and the US) is 
explored without and then with the EU de facto moratorium on GMOs in place.
3 
Plausible assumptions about the farm productivity effects of these new varieties and 
the likely percentage of each crop area that converts to GM varieties are taken from 
the latest literature including Marra, Pardey and Alston (2002), Qaim and Zilberman 
(2003) and Huang et al. (2004). 
The global benefits of GM adoption by the US, Canada and Argentina is 
estimated to be US$2.3 billion per year net of the gains to the biotech firms (which are 
ignored in all that follows) if there were no adverse reactions elsewhere. About one-
quarter of that is shared with the major importing regions of the EU and Northeast 
Asia, 60 percent goes to the three GM-adopting countries, and Brazil, Australia, New 
Zealand and Sub-Saharan Africa other than South Africa lose very slightly because of 
an adverse change in their terms of trade. But when account is taken of the EU 
moratorium, which is similar to an increase in farm protection there, the gain to the 
three GM-adopting countries is reduced by one-third. The diversion of their exports to 
other countries lowers international prices so welfare for the food-importing regions 
of the rest of the world improves – but only very slightly. Meanwhile the EU is worse 
off by $3.1 billion per year minus whatever value EU consumers place on having 
avoided consuming GMOs. If the EU instead were to allow adoption and importation 
of GM varieties, it would benefit because of its own productivity gains and so too 
would net importers of these products elsewhere in the world, while countries that are 
                                                 
3 This has to be done in a slightly inflating way in that the GTAP model is not disaggregated below 
‘coarse grains’ and ‘oilseeds’. However, in the current adopting countries (Argentina, Canada and the 




net exporters of coarse grains and oilseeds (both GM adopters and non-adopters) 
would be slightly worse off (only slightly because coarse grains and oilseeds are 
minor crops in the EU compared with North America).  
However, if by adopting that opposite stance in the EU the rest of the world 
also became uninhibited about adopting GM varieties of these crops, global welfare 
would increase by nearly twice as much as it would when just North America and 
Argentina adopt, and almost all of the extra global gains would be enjoyed by 
developing countries. If one believes the EU’s policy stance is determining the rest of 
the world’s reluctance to adopt GM varieties of these crops, then the cost of the EU’s 
moratorium to people outside the EU15 has been up to $0.4 billion per year for the 
three GM-adopting countries and $1.1 billion per year for other developing countries.  
On the one hand, those estimates overstate the global welfare cost of the EU 
moratorium to the extent that without it, the EU would have used its variable import 
levy capability (or TRQ) to reduce/stop any decline in EU domestic prices for these 
products (see sub-section 3.3 below). But on the other hand, the above estimates 
understate the global welfare cost of the EU’s moratorium in at least three respects. 
First, the fact that the EU’s stance has induced some other countries to also impose 
similar moratoria has not been taken into account.
4 Second, these are comparative 
static simulations that ignore that fact that GM food R&D is on-going and that 
investment in this area has been reduced considerably because of the EU’s extreme 
policy stance as biotech firms redirect their investments towards pharmaceuticals and 
industrial crops instead of food crops. And third, the above results refer to GM 
adoption just of coarse grains and oilseeds. The world’s other two major food crops 
                                                 
4 Sri Lanka was perhaps the first developing country to ban the production and importation of GM 
foods. In 2001 China did the same (with some relaxation in 2002), having been denied access to the EU 
for some soy sauce exports because they may have been produced using GM soybeans imported by 




are rice and wheat, for which GM varieties have been developed and are close to 
being ready for commercial release.  
How have EU farm households been affected by the EU moratorium? The 
above simulation study finds that their real incomes are somewhat higher with the EU 
moratorium than they would be if there was no moratorium and they were allowed to 
adopt GM varieties of maize, soybean and canola (and the EU did not use its variable 
levy capability or TRQs to prevent domestic prices of these products from falling). 
This is because the price decline for those products would more than fully offset the 
productivity gain from adopting GM varieties. It is therefore not surprising that EU 
farmers were not lobbying for a pro-GM policy stance. 
A second set of simulations from the Anderson and Jackson (2005a) study 
involves a repeat of the first set except that China and India are assumed to join 
America in adopting existing GM crop varieties, and GM rice and wheat varieties are 
assumed to be made available to the GM adopting countries’ farmers, again without 
and then with an EU import moratorium. In this case it is simply assumed that total 
factor productivity in GM rice and wheat production would be 5 percent greater than 
with current non-GM varieties. If China were to decide to approve the release of GM 
rice and wheat varieties, India would probably follow soon after. China and India 
account for 55 per cent of the world’s rice market and 30 per cent of the wheat 
market, being close to self sufficient in both. They therefore do not have to worry 
greatly about market access abroad. If that led to enough other non-EU countries 
accepting GM varieties of rice and wheat, this could well lead North American and 
Argentina also to adopt them. 
Allowing China and India to join the GM-adopters’ group, and adding rice and 




biotechnology. The global economic welfare gain if there were no moratoria by the 
EU or others is estimated to be $3.9 billion with just rice added, or $4.3 billion if 
wheat is also added, instead of the $2.3 billion per year when just the original three 
countries and commodities are involved. North America gains only a little more from 
the addition of GM rice and wheat, which might seem surprising given the importance 
to it of wheat, but it is because its productivity gain is almost offset by a worsening of 
its terms of trade as a consequence of their and the other adopters’ additional 
productivity. Two-thirds of the extra $2.0 billion per year from adding rice and wheat 
would accrue to China and India, with other developing countries, as a net grain-
importing group, enjoying most of the residual via lower-priced imports. When the 
EU moratorium is in place, the cost to the EU of its moratorium would rise from $3.4 
to $5.5 billion per year (again not counting the benefit to EU consumers of knowing 
they are not consuming GMOs), while for the rest of the world (again assuming the 
EU policy is discouraging GM adoption elsewhere) it rises from $1.5 billion to $2.9 
billion per year. The adding of further crops to the GM family would continue to 
multiply that latter estimate.
5 
 
3.2 How much do the estimated welfare effects of the EU moratorium in response to 
GM adoption abroad depend on the EU’s existing trade policy distortions? 
  To test the proposition in Section 2 above that at least the net welfare effects 
of technology adoption are not affected greatly by existing trade policies, Anderson 
and Nielsen (2004) conduct a similar set of experiments to the one above (but with the 
earlier Version 4 of the GTAP model and database). Their study also is simpler in that 
it assumes all of each crop in adopting countries uses GM varieties, in contrast to the 
                                                 
5 For a closely related study that focuses on what the EU moratorium means for Africa, see Anderson 




above study which assumes only a subset of the crop (the percentage varying by 
country) is planted to GM varieties in adopting countries. In that respect it overstates 
the likely gains from adoption. But it understates the cost of the EU moratorium in the 
sense that it compares that scenario with one in which the EU simply enjoys the terms 
of trade improvement, rather than also adopting GM technology domestically (as 
assumed in the above Anderson and Jackson (2005a) study). These differences are 
unimportant for the present purpose though, which is to ask how different are the 
estimates of the effect of the EU moratorium if Western Europe’s agricultural 
protectionism was not there (and hence its farm sector was considerably smaller and 
its market more import-dependent).  
The Anderson and Nielsen simulations were run first with 1997 farm policies 
in place and then without any agricultural protectionism in Western Europe, so as to 
get two different base cases to compare with the alternative of the EU moratorium 
being imposed. The results suggest that, without those protectionist policies, an EU 
import ban would cost the EU only $0.4 billion per year less than it has with those 
policies in place. This is consistent with the expectation, from the theory in Alston, 
Edwards and Freebairn (1988) and Alston and Pardey (1996) and from Figure 3 
above, of the aggregate domestic effect even for a large economy being only slightly 
smaller in the presence of protectionist policies. However, without that protectionism 
the EU moratorium would have hurt GM-adopting countries by an estimated $1.05 
billion per year less, and would have helped non-adopters outside the EU by $2.8 
billion less. Those signs are as predicted from Figure 4. 
 
3.3 How much difference does it make if the EU simply maintains domestic prices 




  To address the question of how much bias is introduced if the reality of the 
EU’s variable levy policy and TRQs is ignored, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2004) 
use the GTAP model with the Version 5 database to do a similar but slightly more 
complicated analysis than that of Anderson and Nielsen. Variable import levies and 
variable export subsidies are allowed for cereals, and they are triggered by an 
endogenous price transmission equation involving the EU’s grain trade position.
6 That 
is, the domestic price is not kept completely constant, but its downward movement is 
heavily constrained. As a result, the EU is shielded from the international price falls 
following GM adoption abroad. 
They estimate that this price-insulation mechanism halves the welfare gains 
that the EU would otherwise enjoy from a terms of trade improvement following the 
productivity gains from GM adoption abroad, while reducing the welfare of North 
American adopters (who have to find markets elsewhere for their exports) – although 
only very slightly, and much less so than when an EU ban is imposed. These results 
are thus consistent with the finding in Section 2 above. They imply empirical studies 
that do not incorporate the EU’s variable levy and TRQ policies may overstate only 
slightly the cost to GM adopters of EU discrimination against GM-adopting suppliers, 
but may overstate somewhat more the cost to the EU itself (depending on the extent to 
which the EU would have reduced the decline in domestic prices of these products). 
This problem of overstatement may be greater in the case of other countries with 
larger tariff binding overhangs, should they also be using such variable levy schemes 
or have TRQs also on oilseeds. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The EU’s oilseed levies are not varied because they have been bound in the GATT/WTO at zero (see 
Table 2). It is the tariff/export subsidy not only on maize but also on other cereals that is endogenously 




4. Policy implications 
 
Clearly, the welfare effects of adoption of genetically modified (GM) food and 
feed crop varieties are being affected not only by some countries’ strict regulations 
governing GM food production and consumption, but also by their exogenous and 
endogenous choices of food trade policy instruments. Most notable have been the 
bans on imports of food products that may contain GMOs, particularly by the EU. 
Even with the ending of the European Union’s GM moratorium in April 2004, the EU 
regulations replacing it – and those of numerous other countries – demand costly 
segregation and identity preservation systems that may be just as restrictive as a ban 
on exports from GM-adopting regions (especially developing countries). Indeed they 
may be even more restrictive than was the moratorium, because at least the latter 
allowed approved GM varieties to be shipped without being subject to such strict 
labelling and liability laws. WTO dispute settlement procedures provide an avenue to 
try to reduce these barriers, but no quick and easy resolution is expected (Anderson 
and Jackson 2005c). 
Meanwhile, variable trade taxes-cum-subsidies by the EU and others will 
continue to reduce the aggregate gains from new biotechnologies and the incentive for 
EU taxpayers and life science companies to support GM food research. Because the 
EU – like many other countries – has WTO-bound tariffs well above applied rates, its 
use of variable levies is not inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Nor is its TRQ 
regime. Moreover, the July 2004 Framework agreement for the WTO’s current Doha 
round of negotiations (WTO 2004) includes provision for a special safeguard 
mechanism which could allow developing countries even more scope to use variable 




presented above show that using such a capability to insulate an economy from the 
international price-reducing effects of biotechnology adoption abroad will reduce the 
welfare gains from that new technology (a) for adopters abroad and (b) for consumers 
in the insulating countries. They also dampen the incentive for biotech research 
providers to invest in GM food crops. Given the persistently high rates of return to 
agricultural R&D (Alston et al. 2000), this is yet another reason, on top of the 
standard ones,
7 as to why it is important to seek major reductions in bound 
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Figure 1: Agricultural producer support in high-income countries, by country, 1986-
88 and 2001-03 
 




1 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovac Republic data are for 1991-93 in 
the first period. 
2 Austria, Finland and Sweden are included in the OECD average for both periods but 
also in the EU average for the latter period. 
 


























































































































Figure 4: Effects of GM crop adoption by some exporting Table 1: Agricultural weighted average import tariffs, by region, 2001 
(percent, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
 
  





      
Developed countries  27  22  14 
Developing countries  48  27  21 
    of which: LDCs  78 14  13 
WORLD 37  24  17 
 
a Includes preferences and in-quota TRQ rates where relevant, as well as the ad valorem 
equivalent of specific tariffs. Developed countries include Europe’s transition economies that 
joined the EU in April 2004. The ‘developing countries’ definition used here is that adopted 
by the WTO and so includes East Asia’s four newly industrialized tiger economies, which is 
why the 21 percent shown in column 3 is above the 18 and 14 percent shown in the first 
column of Table 1. 
 





 Table 2: Weighted average import tariffs, EU and all developed countries, selected crop 
products, 2001 
(percent, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
 
 














Maize 69 51 138  53
Oilseeds 0 0 27  9
Wheat 62 58 119  36
Rice 106 87 241  25
Other cereals  70 69 66  16
 
 
a When account is taken for in-quota tariffs of items subject to tariff rate quotas, and non-
reciprocal preferences to developing countries, the actual applied tariff averages are even 
lower, as indicated in Table 1. 
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